Memória P&D Design

10º Congresso Brasileiro de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento em Design

UFMA — São Luís (MA)

Outubro/2012

Entendimento da Racionalidade Limitada no Processo de Projeto: Uma Contribuição à Ciência do Design

The Understanding of Bounded Rationality in Project Process: A Contribution to the Science of Design.

Felipe Gerenda
Leandro Miletto Tonetto

Como citar

Gerenda, Felipe; Tonetto, Leandro Miletto; "Entendimento da Racionalidade Limitada no Processo de Projeto: Uma Contribuição à Ciência do Design", p. 7025-7032. In: CONGRESSO BRASILEIRO DE PESQUISA E DESENVOLVIMENTO EM DESIGN, 10., 2012, São Luís. Anais [...]. São Luís: EDUFMA, 2012

Resumo

Segundo Herbert Simon (1969), a ciência do Design se baseia no processo de tomada de decisão do indivíduo sobre problemas que devem ser bem estruturados. Desta forma, o presente artigo tem como objetivo propor - como fonte de conhecimento pertinente à ciência do Design – o estudo das heurísticas, definidas como atalhos cognitivos inconscientes comumente envolvidos em todos os processos de julgamento e avaliação. Para tanto, toma-se como base uma revisão teórica da abordagem de Herbert Simon aos processos de julgamento e tomada de decisão, juntamente aos conceitos de racionalidade limitada e satisficing.
Palavras-chave:

julgamento e tomada de decisão, racionalidade limitada, processo de projeto

Abstract

According to Herbert Simon (1969), the science of Design is based on the process of decision making over well-structured problems. This paper aims to propose – as a source of knowledge relevant to the science of Design – the study of heuristics, the cognitive shortcuts normally involved in all judgment and evaluation processes. For this purpose, Herbert Simon’s positivist perspective of the decision making processes is used as a basis, along with the concepts of bounded rationality and satisficing.
Keywords:

judgment and decision making, bounded rationality, project process

Referências bibliográficas

  • CROSS, Nigel. Design Cognition: Results from Protocol and Other Empirical Studies of Design Activity. Em: Eastman, C.; Newstatter, W. and McCracken, M. eds. Design knowing and learning: cognition in design education. Oxford, UK: Elsevier, 2001, p. 79–103.

  • CROSS, Nigel. Design Research: A Disciplined Conversation. Design Issues, Vol 15, No. 2, 1999, p. 5-10.

  • DORST, Kees. Design Problems and Design Paradoxes. Design Issues, Vol 22, No.3, 2006, p. 4-17.

  • DESMET, Pieter. A Multilayered Model of Product Emotions. The Design Journal, In Press. 2003.

  • KAHNEMAN, Daniel. A Perspective on Judgement and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality. American Psychologist, Vol. 58, No. 9, 2003, p. 697–720.

  • MUSSWEILER, Thomas; STRACK, Fritz. The Semantics of Anchoring. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 86, No. 2, p. 234–255, 2001.

  • SCHWARTZ, Barry; WARD, Andew. Maximizing Versus Satisficing: Happiness Is a Matter of Choice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 83, No. 5, 2002, p. 1178–1197.

  • SIMON, Herbert. A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 69, No. 1. 1955, p. 99-118.

  • SIMON, Herbert. As Ciências do Artificial. Tradutor: Luís Moniz Pereira. Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Coimbra, 1981, p.21-55, 193-238.

  • SIMON, Herbert. The Structure of Ill Structured Problems. Artificial Intelligence, Vol 4, 1973, p.181-201.

  • SIMON, Herbert. Theories of Bounded Rationality. Volume 1. Economic Analysis and Public Policy, MIT Press, 1972, p.235-44.

  • SMITH, Laurence D. Behaviorism and Logical Positivism: A Reassessment of the Alliance. Stanford University Press, 1986, p.25-66.

  • STERNBERG, R. J. Psicologia Cognitiva. Tradutora: Maria Regina Borges Osório. Porto Alegre: Artes Médicas Sul, 2000. p.22-25, 340-343.

  • TVERSKY, Amos; KAHNEMAN, Daniel. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Science: New Series, Vol. 185, No. 4157, 1974, p. 1124-1131.

  • TVERSKY, Amos; KAHNEMAN, Daniel. Belief in the Law of Small Numbers. Psychological Bulletin, No. 76, 1971, p. 105-110.

  • TVERSKY, Amos; KAHNEMAN, Daniel. The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. Science: New Series, Vol. 211, No. 4481, 1981, p. 453-458.